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 Abstract. The article deals with the problem concerning the principles of the 
metaphysics explanatory basis, which provide the achievement of the goals in 
this most general, most abstract, and, at the same time, the most debatable 
field of knowledge. Different kinds of explanatory basis in metaphysics are 
analyzed – cosmic mereological monism, structural cosmic monism, cosmic 
modal monism, natural substance monism, transcendent substance monism, 
existential monism, abstract monism as well as the similar kinds of 
metaphysical pluralism including atomism and space-time pluralism. The 
implausibility of pluralism and its inefficiency for solving the problems of 
metaphysics is argued, while for metaphysical monism the need for its 
clarification as a grounding force is stated. The conception of super-monism is 
proposed. It is based on the logic of fundamental reality which differs from 
generally accepted formal logic in that it lacks logical laws, primarily the law of 
contradiction. The fundamental reality is defined as pure being which is 
identical with a difference, identity, existence, and the existing. By the 
identification of the various, this reality is defined as one. By identity with 
distinction, this reality is defined as the ground of all world diversity. Being 
which is expressed in terms of difference and identity is reflected in the 
metaphysical formula, which is proposed as the only tool for describing 
everything that exists at the extremely abstract level. 
Keywords: metaphysics; explanatory basis; metaphysical monism; 
metaphysical pluralism; super-monism; the logic of fundamental reality; 




Any science seeks to explain the maximum of 
objects within its subject area using the mini-
mum of explanatory tools – terms and state-
ments which correspond to a certain basic area 
within the subject area of this science. Such a 
basic area can be called the basis of explanation 
within a certain science.  
Metaphysics in this sense is of no difference 
from any other science. The metaphysics speci-
ficity lies only in the fact that its subject area 
comprises everything that exists. The basis of 
explanation in metaphysics is something exis-
tentially fundamental or something which 
grounds everything (it is possible, of course, 
that it coincides with everything that exists). 
Objections to the speculative nature of meta-
physical foundations are highly biased. In any 
of the fundamental sciences, its explanatory 
basis representations are exactly to the same 
extent debatable and inconclusive. In physics, 
for example, generalizing theories serve as the 
basis, by which, it is supposed, all physical 
phenomena can be fully explained. The pres-
ence in modern physics of alternative funda-
mental theories, however, leaves open the 
question of the very possibility of such a physi-
cal theory that would explain everything in 
physical reality. This does not prevent physi-
cists from formulating fundamental theories, 
often quite hypothetical and not based on a suf-
ficient amount of empirical data.  
Metaphysics is no different in this sense from 
physics, especially since it also proceeds from 
empirical data, although more indirectly. One 
can observe an increase of interest in formulat-
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ing theories, which are variants of metaphysi-
cal foundationalism in nowadays metaphysics. 
Metaphysical foundationalism assumes that 
there is the foundation (the first ground, the 
basis) of all that exists, that is, such a reality 
that conditions the existence of all other reali-
ties. The knowledge of such a reality allows, in 
principle, to explain everything that exists both 
at a whole and separately. Metaphysical foun-
dationalism has a solid theoretical justification 
in modern metaphysics, which will not be dis-
cussed here (one of the ways to justify it was 
proposed by the author of this article [5]). 
Along with the rise of metaphysical founda-
tionalism, a new impetus was given to the 
study of the old, already known to ancient phi-
losophy problem – what exactly is the ground 
of everything, and is this foundation something 
one or something multiple? In other words, in 
modern metaphysics, the concepts of meta-
physical monism and metaphysical pluralism, 
as well as the debate between them, get a new 
breath. 
Metaphysical monism proceeds from the exis-
tence of one fundamental reality which 
grounds everything. What exactly is meant by 
fundamental reality is left open and opens a 
variety of possible findings? Different under-
standings of fundamental reality correspond to 
different versions of metaphysical monism. The 
biggest split is between all that exists and not 
all existing, in other words, between reality 
identified with the world itself and that which 
is not the world (not all but something). The 
identification of fundamental reality with the 
real world (or “concrete cosmos”) deserves the 
name of cosmic metaphysical monism. If funda-
mental reality is viewed to be something dif-
ferent from the world itself a metaphysical 
conception may be called substance monism. 
This kind of monism models the world in which 
a specific fundamental substance produces all 
non-fundamental objects. (Ghislain Guigon de-
fines Spinoza’s Monism as a Substance Monism 
[2] but it is more appropriate to label it as cos-
mic modal monism since there is the world con-
sisting of a unique simple substance repre-
sented by modes).  
Substance monism may find its ground within 
the real natural world (the recollection of 
Thales water is the first to come on mind) – 
that is, to be natural substance monism. Or it 
may find its ground outside the real natural 
world – that is, to be transcendent substance 
monism. The most vivid example of the latter is 
demonstrated by Neoplatonism. (Christianity 
complicates its metaphysical monism adopting 
the dogma of Trinity and drifting somewhat 
towards metaphysical transcendent substance 
pluralism).  
The metaphysics of the last decades (at least 
analytical metaphysics) nonetheless is focused 
on another variant of monistic metaphysics – 
on cosmic monism conceptions. According to 
them, the only fundamental object is concrete 
material cosmos. Such an object excludes “pos-
sibilia, abstracta, and actual concreta in catego-
ries other than object” as well as “deities and 
spirits” as the most prominent defender of this 
conception Jonathan Schaffer stresses [9]. Ma-
terial cosmos includes “its planets, pebbles, 
particles, and other proper parts” [8]. Jonathan 
Schaffer calls his variant of metaphysics prior-
ity monism. The essence of this conception is 
expressed by Kelly Trogdon: “According to pri-
ority monism, there are many concrete entities 
and there is one, the cosmos, that is ontologi-
cally before all the others” [11]. Priority mo-
nism does not exclude non-fundamental ob-
jects, just setting the priority of the cosmos 
over them. In other words, “the priority monist 
holds that the cosmos is the only fundamental 
object, of which every other concrete object is a 
dependent part” [9]). The priority principle is 
designed to divert monistic metaphysics from 
what Jonathan Schaffer calls existential monism 
– “the view that exactly one thing exists” [8]. 
Existential monism, however, looks like to be 
out of date now. Are there still any supporters 
of Parmenides? All contemporary variants of 
cosmic monism seem to be adopting more or 
less the existence of non-fundamental objects 
or, in more general terms, – non-fundamental 
realities.  
The modal cosmic monism of Spinoza is, by all 
means, priority monism. Less obvious this is in 
the case of the rival to Schaffer’s monistic pro-
ject in nowadays metaphysics – so-called aus-
tere realistic monism proposed by Terry Hor-
gan and Matjaz Potrc [3, 7]. Its principles are 
these: “1. There is just one concrete particular, 
viz., the whole universe (the blobject); 2. The 
blobject has enormous spatiotemporal struc-
tural complexity and enormous local variability 
– even though it does not have any genuine 
parts [3]. Austere realistic monism denies parts 
within the fundamental reality but does not 
deny its structural complexity. Structural het-
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erogeneity plays here the role of non-
fundamental objects being diverse and differ-
ing from the homogeneous whole universe. 
This variant of the metaphysical cosmic mo-
nism may be called structural cosmic monism.  
Jonathan Schaffer’s conception is based on the 
whole/parts relation. The whole is the cosmos, 
it has parts (which include every concrete ob-
ject other than cosmos) and, also, the whole is 
ontologically before its parts. According to 
mereology standards, the whole is not identical 
to its parts (“the cosmos is not identical to the 
plurality of its planets, pebbles, or particles, or 
any other plurality of its many proper 
parts” [8]). So the cosmos is the One but it has 
parts. Schaffer’s variant of metaphysical mo-
nism may be called cosmic mereological mo-
nism.  
Apart from cosmic monism, it is said about ab-
stract monism in modern metaphysics. It is not 
obvious that all concreta are grounded by fur-
ther concreta [10]. So a fundamental reality can 
be abstract and not be material cosmos. Ab-
stract reality can coincide with the cosmos (the 
whole world) or not. Accordingly, we can speak 
about abstract cosmic monism and abstract sub-
stance monism. It is imaginable that abstract 
fundamental reality grounds only abstract enti-
ties [10]. But this leads to separation of ab-
stract and concrete (material cosmic) funda-
mental realities, in other words, to metaphysi-
cal pluralism. Therefore abstract monism is 
possible only if basic abstract unique reality 
grounds everything including concrete material 
objects. 
Metaphysical pluralism is a concept recognizing 
the existence of many (at least two) independ-
ent foundations of everything that exists. In 
terms of options, metaphysical pluralism is a 
mirror image of metaphysical monism. We can 
talk about cosmic pluralism and transcendent 
pluralism. The most consistent version of cos-
mic pluralism is atomism. Mirroring the con-
ception of priority monism it is often said about 
priority pluralism, i. e. about “the thesis that 
wholes are grounded in or ontologically de-
pend on their parts” [1]. Priority atomism is 
viewed to be a kind of priority pluralism, argu-
ing that “there are multiple atoms (simple con-
creta)…, and any complex concrete entity de-
composes into atoms such that the latter 
ground the former” [10]. The substitution of 
priority monism by mereological monism de-
mands the same transformation of the term 
“priority pluralism”. So it seems more accurate 
to say about mereological pluralism and its at-
omistic variant. There is one more variant of 
mereological pluralism mentioned in meta-
physical papers which is close to atomism – ac-
cording to it “the basic concreta are space-time 
points” [4], not material atoms. 
This article's objective is to make it clear that 
all discussed variants of monism and pluralism 
are unsatisfactory from their claims to express 
the explanatory basis of metaphysics. It will be 
shown that some more thoroughly reasoned 
conception is possible, which, being generally 
monistic, does not exclude pluralism and which 
could be called in this context super-monism. It 
will be argued that the object of this theoretic 
construction, the fundamental world reality, 
expressed by minimal conceptual means, 
makes a formula, consecutive application of 
which should allow us to describe at an ex-
tremely abstract level everything that exists.  
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Metaphysical pluralism is not a working con-
ception. Two cases are possible while imple-
menting this idea.  
A) Basic realities (metaphysical atoms) are in-
dependent of each other. Then they are the real 
basis of everything. But complete independ-
ence means non-coexistence. For example, if 
you imagine the world that is completely, abso-
lutely, in any sense disconnected with our 
world, then neither part of this outer world do 
exist for our world. Our world is all that exists 
and this is so just because we define the World 
as all that exists. (We are not talking about hy-
pothetical other physical universes. Since they 
are physical, they are not completely unrelated 
to our physical universe, in a sense they are 
similar to our physical world). It does not seem 
possible that there coexist objects that are de-
rived from mutually independent primary fun-
damental objects. The independence of funda-
mental realities must also be preserved in the 
entities grounded by them, otherwise, any of 
the fundamental realities is not independent, 
since it allows something in common with 
other fundamental realities (common products 
or consequences). Thus, the world as every-
thing existing cannot be based on multiple in-
dependent entities. 
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B) Suppose that basic realities are intercon-
nected and interdependent. Then they are not 
basic realities. They have something in com-
mon, which is a necessary condition for their 
existence. This common part or aspect of basic 
realities is different from each of the assumed 
basic realities, otherwise (if it coincides with 
one of them) we do not have basic realities, but 
the unique fundamental object and realities de-
rived from it. A common reality, which differs 
from all assumed basic realities, is an obvious 
condition for their existence, while the exis-
tence of each of the basic realities is not a con-
dition for the existence of a common reality as 
such (it would exist in a case when any of the 
basic realities is subtracted, including even the 
situation in which there are only two realities). 
Thus, the common reality that we singled out is 
the actual primary ground of everything, and 
the alleged basic realities already mentioned 
are not basic. 
Undoubtedly, metaphysical monism is a work-
ing conception for explaining everything that 
exists. Monism, however, requires clarification 
and resolution of a number of the problems it 
creates. Concrete monism does not work, that 
is, the recognition of a concrete object as the 
ground of the whole world. First of all, we need 
to keep in mind cosmic monism, equally – 
mereological and non-mereological, as well as 
substance monism – theological or not. Cosmos 
as a concrete whole has a set of specific proper-
ties (which are parts of the cosmos as it ap-
pears in mereological monism, and space-time 
inhomogeneities in non-mereological monism). 
Each specific property is not fundamental (this 
follows from what has been said about meta-
physical pluralism). Moreover, their combina-
tion is not fundamental (for the same reason). 
Cosmos in the holistic concept of J. Schaffer is 
something more than a collection of parts. If 
this super-partial reality depends on parts of 
the cosmos, it is not fundamental. If it does not, 
it is a special reality, and it is fundamental, but 
not specifically cosmic. 
Monism arising from the idea of super-cosmic 
reality inevitably turns out to be transcendent 
monism. It is consistent with religion, although 
it does not necessarily have religious content. It 
is irrational, therefore unscientific. As an op-
tion for explaining our world, it has the right to 
exist and can be true (one may agree that sci-
ence does not have a monopoly on truth), but it 
needs convincing evidence while we have none 
for the time being. Here it is not a subject of re-
flection, we are talking about the possibilities 
of scientific metaphysics. 
If one insists on the coincidence of the funda-
mental ground of everything that exists with 
the world in which we find ourselves, then 
cosmic monism turns out to be nothing more 
than existential monism. The world as a fun-
damental reality should be one thing, without 
any parts, structures, and heterogeneities. 
Given that: 1) abstract objects are determined 
by qualitative scarcity, having fewer attributes 
compared to concrete objects; and 2) the only 
attribute that unites everything in the world is 
existence (this follows from the definition of 
the world as “everything existing”), the world 
must be conceived as an extremely abstract ob-
ject. Such an object, at the same time, stands as 
an ultimate abstract object to a diverse con-
crete cosmos. Existential monism, in this per-
spective, is the final case of abstract monism. 
Any other abstract monism (emanating from 
abstractions of non-ultimate, non-terminal lev-
els, for example, from mathematical sets) loses, 
similarly to concrete cosmic monism, its fun-
damental character. 
Existential abstract monism is incontrovertible 
from its being grounded (as that which needs 
no grounding). The foundation of everything is 
recognized as the world and identically as eve-
rything existing, so the only attribute of the 
world is its existence. All that exists in the 
world. The World and the Existing happen to 
be the same. In such an object, the property co-
incides with what has this property, completely 
dissolves in it. The existing is the same as exis-
tence. Existence is existing. (This unity of exis-
tence and the existing can be expressed by the 
term "being"). There is no need to ground such 
a foundation. After all, grounding something, 
we find the justification for its existence. But 
what could be the ground of existence itself? 
Why does existence exist? Because it is exis-
tence. It has the ground of its existence in itself, 
or rather, it does not require any ground. The 
question of some ground for existence outside 
existence is illogical and meaningless. Note that 
this principle causa sui applies only to exis-
tence and not do anything more. 
On the other hand, existential abstract monism 
looks completely helpless from its grounding 
power (as that which grounds). Nothing can be 
deduced from pure being in itself. Peering into 
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pure being a metaphysician feels like having no 
chances to make it clear where all the diversity 
of the world comes from. We cannot follow 
Hegel and build the world on the dialectic of 
pure being and nothing. Nothing (absolute non-
existence) does not exist in any sense (unlike 
relative non-existence – the non-existence of 
something, non-existence somewhere, or 
sometimes). Therefore, nothing has nothing to 
do with being, even as a negation (to be a nega-
tion something must exist in some sense, which 
does not apply to absolute non-existence). All 
that we have is being (existence indistinguish-
able from the existing). Being in itself is not fol-
lowed by anything – both logically and natu-
rally. This is the initial problem of metaphysical 
foundationalism. 
The world which metaphysicians talk about is 
both complex and simple. The world is all that 
exists, and therefore it is something plural, an 
aggregate of entities. At the same time, the 
world is one thing and in this sense the monis-
tic idea of the world is true. In order not to con-
fuse the two meanings of the term "world", we 
will call the world as multiplicity the cosmos 
(the world-cosmos), and the world as some-
thing one being (the world-being). The world-
cosmos completely coincides with the world-
being. It is also obvious that these two terms 
refer to different realities. One is many, but one 
cannot be many. Note that we are talking about 
extreme abstractions, therefore, there is no 
resolution of the contradiction by assigning the 
identity of concepts to their extension, and the 
difference to their intensions. The contradic-
tion is insoluble. Let’s fixate this position.  
A contradiction is a logical state of affairs, 
which usually indicates the falsity of one of the 
conflicting statements. Therefore, the first pos-
sible consequence of the contradiction men-
tioned here is to admit the falsity of monistic 
conception and return to pluralism (which, as 
has been shown, is also false). Another possible 
solution is to recognize the inapplicability of 
logic itself for the position we have fixed. Logic 
is, in fact, a set of the most abstract links of any 
existing objects normalized and expressed in 
terms. One may assume that the foundation of 
reality is outside the action of the laws of logic 
(in any case, outside of what is commonly ac-
cepted as logic).  
The reason for this is that within the founda-
tion of reality the concept of a link is irrelevant. 
The foundation of reality lies before all connec-
tions and relations that should only arise along 
with realities derived from the foundation. 
There are no connections of objects – there is 
no logic – there are no laws of logic – there is 
no law of contradiction. “Something (the world-
being) is something else (the world-cosmos)” 
and “something (the world-being) is only itself 
and not the other (the world-cosmos)” are 
completely compatible statements. Both ex-
press reality – the same reality and not the 
same reality. Note that we are not talking about 
the connection of objects, we are only talking 
about their direct, immediate, and complete 
identity and the same difference. 
This denying the traditional logic manner of 
reasoning is similar to Hegel's dialectical logic. 
But, firstly, as already noted, the concept of 
nothing (absolute non-existence) does not ap-
ply here. Secondly, it is not going about being 
out of itself or being-other (Anderssein). The ba-
sic principle of dialectical logic: something is 
itself and is something else, another posits it-
self as the being-other of the previous object (or 
a concept in Hegel’s word). In developed form, 
being-other is a negation of the previous reality 
(going through the stages of difference, opposi-
tion, contradiction, and reaching negation). It 
looks like this is too complex a construction, 
characteristic rather of thinking, but not of be-
ing. Being is simpler than that. It is extremely 
simple. In being, everything is limited to iden-
tity and difference only. Something is identical 
to itself. Something is different from another. 
Something is identical to another. Being identi-
cal to another, something is not something be-
ing out of itself. It is just identical to another (in 
some sense) but is not lost in another. The 
identity to another is preserved along with the 
identity to itself. The difference from another is 
preserved along with the difference from one’s 
own identity with another. Something does not 
differ from itself, but differs from itself, being 
identical to another, that is, differs always from 
another (not from itself). In these provisions, 
all prelogical (from generally accepted formal 
logic) reality is expressed. 
Being which is identical with itself can be called 
simply identity. Being is not different from 
identity, identity in itself (not the identity of 
something, but pure identity) is identical to be-
ing. Being which is different from identity (and 
from itself as an identity) is identical to differ-
ence. Being is different from the difference. The 
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difference is identical to being and differs from 
it. In the same way, the difference is identical to 
the difference and identical to identity. The dif-
ference is different from identity and different 
from the difference that is identical to identity. 
Being as the difference can be identified with 
existence. Being an identity can be identified 
with the existing. Being is a difference, identity, 
the existing, existence. This is the same, there-
fore we can talk about a single world reality, 
which underlies everything. This idea of a sin-
gle reality is metaphysical monism (abstract 
and existential). On the other hand, there is di-
versity in this one reality, because this one re-
ality is a difference. One can argue that the fun-
damental ground of all that exists is a pure dif-
ference, taking into account that difference is 
identical with being or identical with the 
world-being, the world as one. The ground of 
everything is an abstract self-identical object – 
difference (diversity). So far, this diversity is 
extremely limited and extremely abstract. But 
it contains the basis for branching into the di-
verse cosmos. 
The difference is different and identical to it-
self. Taken in this aspect, it turns out to be the 
existing (is identical to the existing). Otherwise, 
it can be expressed this way: the existing is the 
difference (is identical to difference). The dif-
ference is the difference between something 
and something else. Since that which is differ-
ent is also something existing, there is the ob-
ject A, which is different, the object B, from 
which the object A is different, the object C, 
which is identical to the difference of the object 
A from the object B. If the task of metaphysics 
is to determine the entire diversity of things, 
then this can be done on the ground that all 
things are identical to a difference between en-
tities (or objects) that differ from them. For-
mally this is expressed as "C is identical to the 
difference of A from B". The metaphysical su-
per-monism which is described here gives rea-
son to assert that any object (defined as that 
which exists and is identical to itself and differs 
from everything else) is determined by the 
formula expressed above (it can be called the 
basic formula of metaphysics). Repeating this 
formula infinitely, one can describe the whole 
world at an extremely abstract (metaphysical) 
level, embracing everything that exists in one 
way or another (in any sense of the word). A 
metaphysical system, in this case, is reduced to 
unlimited repetition (iteration) of one formula. 
The format of the article does not allow us to 
present the result of such a metaphysical de-
scription of the world. The result (however 
vastly far from even relatively complete) can be 
found in the book [6].  
 
CONCLUSION 
The content of the article can be reduced to 
such basic statements. 
Metaphysics (as the science of the existing or of 
the world as a whole), like other sciences, is 
focused on the description of its subject – the 
totality of existing, the world as a whole – as 
fully as possible and by minimal means. This 
task is performed by metaphysical fundamen-
talism, recognition of the fundamental ground 
of everything that exists, which is the ultimate 
foundation in the chain of objects grounding. 
The two possible forms of fundamentalism are 
metaphysical pluralism and metaphysical mo-
nism, modern versions of which are analyzed 
in the article. Theoretical reflection shows the 
implausibility of pluralism and its inefficiency 
in solving the problems of metaphysics. As for 
metaphysical monism, it is appropriate to 
agree with both its absolute validity and the 
need for clarification as a grounding force. An 
understanding of monism is proposed based on 
the logic of fundamental reality which differs 
from generally accepted formal logic in that it 
lacks logical laws, primarily the law of contra-
diction. The fundamental reality is defined as 
pure being which is identical with a difference, 
identity, existence, and the existing. By the 
identification of the various, this reality is de-
fined as one. By identity with distinction, this 
reality is defined as the ground of all world di-
versity. Being which is expressed in terms of 
difference and identity is reflected in the meta-
physical formula, which is proposed as the only 
tool for describing everything that exists at the 
extremely abstract level. 
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